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WHY SELL WHAT YOU CAN LICENSE? CONTRACTING




Owners of intellectual property can choose to sell the intellectual
property, license the intellectual property, sell products that embody the
intellectual property, or license products that embody the intellectual prop-
erty. Traditionally, owners of intellectual property chose one of the first
three options, resulting in a publicly-legislated intellectual property regula-
tion system reflective of this norm. Now, however, intellectual property
owners increasingly choose to lipense products that embody their intellec-
tual property and use privately-legislated licenses to augment their intellec-
tual property rights and circumvent publicly-legislated restrictions. This
private legislating activity is not new, but it was not until the software in-
dustry's maturation that licenses of chattels embodying intellectual property
became an accepted norm. Such licenses historically were used to augment
the protection of ideas and expressions otherwise difficult to protect under
intellectual property law.1 Recently, however, the use of private legislation
to circumvent and frustrate public legislation has expanded, due to the suc-
cess of software licenses, and now owners of many types of intellectual
property are relying on private legislation, rather than public legislation, to
regulate users' rights in their chattels.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Catholic University of America. Versions of this Article were
presented at the 2005 Works-In-Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium and the 2006 International
Contracts Conference. The author thanks the participants at each for their comments and suggestions.
Much appreciation is extended to R. Whitney Winston, Thomas J. Madden, Richard Gruner, David
Welkowitz, and Michael Evans for their helpful comments and to Michael Zingale for his invaluable
research assistance.
I Using contracts to augment intellectual property protection first gained popularity with the use
of software licenses at a time when statutory protection for software was close to non-existent:
Historically, the purpose of "licensing" computer program copy use was to employ contract
terms to augment trade secret protection in order to protect against unauthorized copying at a
time when, first, the existence of a copyright in computer programs was doubtful, and, later,
when the extent to which copyright provided protection was uncertain.
Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Rice Decl.
16).
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The Maryland State Bar Association provides one example of this use
of private legislation. In an effort to circumvent the publicly-legislated re-
strictions on its intellectual property rights, the Maryland State Bar Asso-
ciation does not sell its Maryland Lawyers Manual, an annual directory of
lawyers and judges, to its members, but rather licenses it to them.2 Bar As-
sociation members receive their copy of the Manual shrink-wrapped with a
contract "meant to be binding on anyone who breaks the plastic seal.
Among its terms: No reselling, loaning, or giving away the book."3 Public
legislation restricts the rights of copyright owners after the first sale of the
book, denying them any control over the reselling, loaning, or sharing of
the sold copyrighted material.4 Private legislation allows the Maryland State
Bar Association to circumvent the first sale restriction and to control the
use of the directory after it has been sold. If a lawyer who is not a member
of the Maryland State Bar wishes to look up information about a judge in
his firm's copy of the Manual, she may not borrow a copy from the firm
library without breaching the contract. This is hardly an isolated example.
Chattels, traditionally thought of as being sold, are now regularly licensed.
These chattels include agricultural goods, musical recordings, artwork, and
digital cameras. These licenses withhold warranties, circumvent the first
sale doctrine, frustrate fair use exemptions, obstruct the on-sale bar, and
remove other proprietary rights.
One of the most disturbing aspects of this trend is the characterization
of many sales as licenses. If an agreement is characterized as a license but
is actually a sale, then the private legislation cannot circumvent the pub-
licly-legislated rights granted the consumer and any privately-legislated
restrictions are not binding. So how to determine whether an agreement is a
sale or a license? Applying the traditional normative justifications for the
protection of contractual interests to such ambiguous agreements can help
determine the intention of an agreement and whether the parties intended
the transaction to be a license or a sale.
Neither the traditional norms of contract law nor the policies behind
the protection of intellectual property support enforcement of agreements
that exist primarily to frustrate public legislation. The public and specific
individuals suffer the effects of licenses that fall into this category. Pri-
vately-legislated licenses do have a role in the commercialization of intel-
lectual property and products that embody intellectual property. However, a
balance must be struck between protecting intellectual property owners'
right to contract and protecting the public's interest in the promotion of the
2 Ed Foster, Sneakwrap Abounds, INFOWORLD, Oct. 25, 2002, available at http://www.infoworld
.com/article/02/l0/25/021028opgripe_ .html.
3 Lorraine Woellert, Throw This Book-But Don't Share It, BUS. WK., Dec. 9,2002, at 8.
4 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
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progress of science and the useful arts. Some licenses promote progress,
while others retard it.
The use of private legislation to augment rights may be necessary, but
its use to circumvent public legislation upsets this ever-precarious balance.
The balance that currently exists reflects the traditional practices of selling
intellectual property, licensing it, or selling chattels that embody it. That
precarious balance is upset by licensing products that embody intellectual
property. The norms of licensing such products are being set by those who
benefit most from a balance tilted towards the right to contract and so do
not reflect the public's interest in the promotion of "the progress of science
and useful arts"-that is, innovation.' By licensing such chattels instead of
selling them or their intellectual property, owners can acquire interests that
may not be socially beneficial.
Section I of this Article discusses the expansion of the private legisla-
tion model. Section II provides numerous examples of the ways that private
legislation is being used to circumvent public legislation. Section In ex-
plores factors helpful in understanding what rights accompany the transfer
of chattel and whether a given transaction is a sale or a license. Finally,
Section IV considers the legitimate purposes of privately-legislated li-
censes.
I. THE EXPANSION OF THE PRIVATE LEGISLATION MODEL
In 1997, Homan McFarling6 bought soybean seed from Jimmy Sand-
ers's seed shop in Ecru, Mississippi.7 As he had done every year of his
farming life, McFarling purchased a variety of soybean seeds.' When the
farming season concluded, he evaluated his yield and saved some of the
most profitable seed for use the next year, including a genetically modified
seed developed by Monsanto.9 For this time-honored practice," Monsanto
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
6 Homan McFarling farms 5,000 acres in rural Mississippi. His father and grandfather were both
farmers on that land, and he and his three sons are partners in the family farm. Interview with Homan
McFarling, near Tupelo, Miss. (Jan. 2005).
7 When the author visited Jimmy Sanders's seed shop, no one would speak with her about
McFarling. The employee with whom the author did speak stated that licensing seed was the norm and
that, in fact, Jimmy Sanders's seed shop sold no seed without an accompanying agreement limiting the
purposes for which the seed could be used. Interview with unidentified employee of Jimmy Sanders's
seed shop, in Ecru, Miss. (Jan. 2005).
8 Interview with Homan McFarling, near Tupelo, Miss. (Jan. 2005).
9 Farmers save seed for many reasons. Every year new hybrids and new varieties of seed are
produced with specific varieties developed for different climates and different growing environments
2006]
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sued McFarling. Monsanto argued that it had not sold the seed to McFar-
ling but instead had only granted him a "limited use license" to use the seed
for one generation." The courts found that McFarling's actions breached
the license. 2
In 2002, a consumer licensed a digital camera subject to a clause stat-
ing that anyone in the consumer's household could use the camera but that
(e.g., resisting cocklebur weed in Mississippi or foxtail weed in North Dakota). Some of these varieties
will succeed, and some will fail. Therefore, to reduce risk of low yield and profitability, rather than
gamble on one variety of seed, farmers choose to plant their fields with multiple varieties. McFarhing
spent months reviewing seed descriptions and determining which varieties to purchase. At the end of
each growing season, McFarling determined which variety had the highest yield and saved enough of
that seed to plant roughly fifty percent of his acreage the next year. He would plant the other fifty per-
cent with new varieties that he purchased. Before the introduction of genetically modified seed, this was
standard farming practice. If the new seed did not work as the developers hoped, the seed that had
previously worked would likely work well again. On the other hand, if a new variety produced a higher
yield, then McFarling would reap some of that benefit, and he would save the new variety of seed for
the following year. Interview with Homan McFarling, near Tupelo, Miss. (Jan. 2005).
10 Saving seed promotes biodiversity and protects the farmer as well as the agricultural industry.
Prior to the introduction of genetically modified seed, saving seed was the usual practice among farmers
since time immemorial. Cf Seedsaving and Seedsavers' Resources, http://homepage.tinet.ie/-merlyn/se
edsaving.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). The Plant Variety Protection Act specifically states that:
[I]t shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by the person
from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the vari-
ety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on the
farm of the person, or for sale as provided in this section.
7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2000).
11 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, No. 4:00CV84 CDP, 2002 WL 32069634, at *34 (E.D. Mo. Nov.
5, 2002), aft'd, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Since the sale to McFarling, Monsanto has
changed its notification, and in 2004, a farmer purchasing seed from Monsanto received the seed in a
bag carrying the following language:
This seed carries a limited license under U.S. patent ... 5,352,605 ... solely to produce a
single commercial crop in one and only one season. This license does not extend to the seed
from such crop or the progeny thereof by propagation or seed multiplication. The use of such
seed or the progeny thereof for propagation or seed multiplication.. . is strictly prohibited.
Monsanto Co. v. Good, No. Civ.A.01-5678 FLW, 2004 WL 1664013, at *2 (D.N.J. July 23, 2004)
(citing Mem. in Supp. of Monsanto Company's Mot. for Partial Summ. J.). The 2003 Monsanto Tech-
nology/Stewardship Agreement stated that it was a limited use license and grants its signatories limited
rights:
A limited use license to purchase and plant seed containing Monsanto Technologies ("Seed")
and apply Roundup agricultural herbicides and other authorized non-selective herbicides
over the top of Roundup Ready crops (see TUG [Technical Use Guide] for details regarding
authorized non-selective products). Monsanto retains ownership of the Monsanto Technolo-
gies including the genes (for example, the Roundup Ready gene) and the gene technologies.
2003 Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement, available at http://www.mindfully.org/GE/2003/
Monsanto-Technology-Agreement2003.htm. This license operates for a period of one year on all Mon-
santo genetically modified seed.
12 See McFarling, 2002 WL 32069634, at *4-5.
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the camera could not be lent to anyone else. 3 If the consumer wished to
have a stranger take a family picture, she would have to breach the license
or use a different camera. 4
In 2003, George Hotelling licensed a song from the iTunes Music
Store," an Internet service that allows users to license songs and albums
and download them to their computers.' 6 iTunes is, essentially, the next
generation of the neighborhood record store, with one very important dif-
ference: instead of purchasing a music work, users purchase a limited use
license to play the song or album for "personal, noncommercial use."' 7 Ho-
telling attempted to resell an iTunes song on eBay, and found that the list-
ing violated eBay's "Downloadable Media Policy."' 8 eBay differentiates
between the purchasers of an album based on the medium of the album.
Owners of a digital copy of a music work who wish to sell the work on
eBay must also own the copyright in the work. 9 Owners of a physical copy
13 Foster, supra note 2. One example of such a license is found accompanying the Canon EOS-1D
digital camera. The license for firmware that comes with a Canon EOS-1D digital camera states that the
consumer shall not "assign, sublicense, sell, rent, lease, loan, convey or otherwise transfer to any third
party, or copy, duplicate, translate or convert to another programming language the Software, except as
expressly provided herein." Canon EOS-ID Mark I1 N Firmware License Agreement, available at
http://web.canon.jp/lmaging/eosldm2n/eosldmk2nfirmware-e.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2006). The
software is embedded in the camera, and the camera cannot operate without it. As the licensor cannot
loan, convey, or otherwise transfer the software to another, the licensor cannot lend the camera to any-
one else-even to take a family picture. Furthermore, Canon uses the license to disclaim all support
obligations; the software could render the camera useless and Canon would have no obligation to fix it.
Id.
14 See Canon EOS-ID Mark U N Firmware License Agreement, available at http://web.canon.jp/
Imaging/eos I dm2n/eos I dmk2nfirmware-e.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2006).
15 Heather Green, You Bought a Song. Now Try to Sell It, BUS. WK., Sept. 29, 2003, at 14.
16 On August 30, 2005, the iTunes website stated, "Forget About Shrink-wrap. If you've ever
been frustrated by Compact Disc packaging-rip-stop shrink-wrap, that nasty top cap of seriously
adhesive plastic-welcome to the age of digital music. No broken fingernails, no tape sticking on your
fingers. Just good clean music, delivered straight to iTunes." Apple Computer, Inc., iTunes Music Store,
http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/buy.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2005). Perhaps the consumer can
forget about shrink-wrap, but not about shrink-wrap licenses. iTunes' Terms of Service, to which all its
customers must agree, state that the iTunes Service "include[s] a security framework using technology.
. that limits.., usage of Products to certain usage rules established by Apple and its licensors." Apple
Computer, Inc., iTunes Music Store Terms of Service, http://www.apple.comllegallitunes/us/service.ht
ml [hereinafter iTunes Terms of Service] (last visited Sept. 17, 2006). Perhaps realizing the irony in its
statement, Apple has since removed the "Forget About Shrink-Wrap" language from its website.
17 iTunes Terms of Service, supra note 16.
18 eBay, Inc., Downloadable Media Policy, http://pages.ebay.comhelp/policies/downloadable.htm
I (last visited July 15, 2006) ("Only copyright owners are permitted to sell items or products which are
intended to be delivered to the buyer by electronic download through the Internet. Sellers who own the
copyrights to this downloadable media being sold must state this fact in their listings and must be able
to prove this ownership to eBay.").
19 Id.
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of a music work who wish to sell the work on eBay may do so whether they
own the copyright or not.
Each consumer above exchanged consideration for a chattel without
purchasing or receiving title to the chattel.' Instead, each received a license
to use the chattel.2 A license is a contract between two parties, one of
whom owns intellectual property (the licensor) that the other (the licensee)
wishes to use.2 A licensee owns neither the ideas nor the expression of
such ideas associated with that intellectual property and may only use the
intellectual property in the manner allowed by the license.3
20 Examples abound of intellectual property owners restricting the rights of consumers through
licenses. The few examples in this Section illustrate the issues associated with a failure to regulate the
use of contracts to expand the rights of intellectual property owners. Other equally expansive licenses
exist are not discussed herein-for instance, the particularly draconian license offered by the manufac-
turer of the TemplateMaster Tm woodworking tool. The license agreement contains the following
clauses:
You may: a. use the Product (or any of the working templates produced using the Product or
Process) in only one shop by the original purchaser only; b. make one (1) copy of the in-
structions for backup purposes, provided that you reproduce all proprietary notices on the
copy; and c. use the Process described in the instruction book (multiple US patents pending)
only with the original Product provided with the instruction book.
You may not: a. allow individuals that did not purchase the original Product use the Product
or any templates produced using the Product or Process described (without specific written
permission from the Stots Corporation); b. modify, translate, reverse engineer, create deriva-
tive works based on, or copy (except for the backup copy) the instruction book; c. rent or
lease the Product, templates produced using the Product and the Process, any rights granted
by this license agreement, or accompanying documentation in any form to any person with-
out the prior written consent of Stots which, if give, is subject to the transferee's consent to
the terms and conditions of this license; d. remove any proprietary notices, labels, or marks
on the Product, documentation, and containers; and e. copy the Product using the Process (or
any other means).
All rights, title, interest, and all copyrights to the documentation, and any copy made by you
remain with Stots. Unauthorized copying of the Product or the documentation, or failure to
comply with the above restrictions, will result in automatic termination of this license and
will make available to Stots other legal remedies.
Stots Corp., TemplateMaster TM License Agreement, available at http://www.stots.com/agree.htm (last
visited Sept. 17, 2006). According to the tool's license agreement, if Mrs. Madden licenses the Tem-
plateMaster Tm, then other members of her household, including Mr. Madden, may not use it without the
prior written consent of the tool's manufacturer. See id.
21 For purposes of this Article, a sale is defined as a transfer of tide and all associated rights,
while a license involves a transfer of rights but not of title. Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 16
(1913) ("There was no transfer of a limited right to use this invention, and to call the sale a license to
use is a mere play upon words.").
22 This Article does not address the more traditional use of a license of the intellectual property
itself; rather, it addresses the licensing of chattels that benefit from the intellectual property.
23 Historically, licensors limited only the geographic scope or the field of use scope of intellectual
property. See, e.g., Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873) (geographic limitation on a patent licensee). A
licensee of the "Air Jordan" mark, for example, might have been limited to use of the mark only in
California or only on baseball gloves. As the scope of licenses has expanded, so has the scope of limita-
tions, and now it is conceivable that a license could be entered into for the use of the "Air Jordan" mark
on sneakers that would limit the licensee from wearing the sneakers while playing basketball.
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The public policy behind the protection of intellectual property seeks
to balance competing interests. Traditionally, agreements regulated the
sharing of intellectual property itself, securing for the owners the exclusive
right to control their intellectual property as envisioned by the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787.24 Licenses of intellectual property maintained
the balance, and courts have distinguished these licenses from sales and
other contracts, deferring to the perceived bargain licensees entered into,
because they viewed such licenses as encouraging both the development
and sharing of information.25 However, as the scope of licenses has ex-
panded beyond their traditional use-licensing patents, trademarks, and
copyrights-to licensing the chattels that embody the intellectual property
(e.g., agricultural goods, writings, and other physical goods). The balance
appears to be shifting towards the owners of intellectual property and away
from the public interest. As private interests realize the limits of the pub-
licly-legislated protection available to intellectual property owners and the
value of private legislation in augmenting intellectual property protection,
the norm is shifting from one relying on public legislation for protection to
one relying on private legislation.26
The use of contracts to privately legislate control over chattels that
embody intellectual property is fundamentally different from the publicly-
legislated grant of rights. Recognizing this distinction, the Supreme Court
has emphasized the limitations that public legislation places on the rights of
intellectual property owners to control their works after the first sale, while
pointing out that such limitations might not be controlling if the limitations
had been privately legislated.27 In 1913, the Supreme Court reiterated this
24 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
25 One of the parties thought to benefit the most from a license is the independent inventor, who
may have the spark of genius but lack the capital needed to market his invention. Through a licensing
arrangement, the independent inventor could profit from his spark of genius while society profits from
the innovation as introduced by the licensee. Cf. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY & THE LICENSING EXECUTIVES
SOCIETY, MAKING THE LICENSING DECISION I (1998), available at http://www.expertson.com/New-Pr
oductDevelopment/Making%20Licensing%2ODecision.pdf.
26 Sharon Sandeen accurately frames the ongoing academic debate about the propriety of using
contracts to acquire rights beyond those granted statutorily:
Those who question the use of private ordering to expand the scope of intellectual property
rights generally argue that since intellectual property laws reflect a careful balancing of
competing interests, including the public's interest, contracts that attempt to alter the balance
should not be enforced. Those who promote the use of contracts to fill the gaps of intellec-
tual property law invoke the principle of freedom of contract and argue that individuals and
companies should generally be free to order their private relationships any way they see fit.
Sharon K. Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name is Still a Contract: Examining the Effectiveness of
Trade Secret Clauses to Protect Databases, 45 IDEA: J.L. & TECH 119, 122-23 (2005).
27 See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350(1908).
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point with respect to the publicly-legislated limits placed on patents, differ-
entiating between the scenario where "the owner of a patent granted a li-
cense to the defendant to manufacture and sell harrows embodied in the
invention covered by the patent" and the scenario where "a patentee...
parted with a patented machine by passing title to a purchaser." 8 In the
license scenario, the owner was allowed to control the resale price of the
licensed article, while the patentee who sells an article "has placed the arti-
cle beyond the limits of the monopoly secured by the patent act" and cannot
regulate the resale price.29
Intellectual property owners were slow to recognize and take advan-
tage of the benefits of this distinction. Public legislation provided intellec-
tual property owners with a strong and robust set of rights, and rather than
look elsewhere for protection of their rights, intellectual property owners
sought to expand those publicly-legislated rights. It was not until the devel-
opment of computer software that the use of private legislation began to
take off. Arguing that federal and state statutory protection of software was
inadequate, software developers turned to privately-legislated protection for
their property through the use of licenses.30
Software expedited the expansion of the use of private legislation
"[b]ecause software is different [and] traditional copyright practices do not
always fit."31 Books can be shrink-wrapped-and on rare occasion were,
with the accompanying privately-legislated controls-but consumers bring
with them a preconceived notion of a set of rights when they purchase
books, one that does not limit the consumer's use of the book. No such
notion, however, existed for software. Software was new, difficult to pro-
tect, expensive to develop, and easy to replicate." As a result, the software
industry promulgated a standard of private legislation, whereby licensing
products that embody intellectual property and allow the intellectual prop-
erty owner to retain title became the norm. Reflecting this shift, a new lan-
guage developed to describe software licenses, arising out of the difficulty
of facilitating contracts between corporations and consumers when there
may be no privity between the two. Commonly referred to as "shrink-wrap"
licenses, "click-wrap" licenses, or "browse-wrap" licenses, these software
28 Bauer& Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 14, 17 (1913).
29 See id. at 17.
30 See, e.g., Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091-92 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
31 Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software "Licenses" Really
Sales, and How Will the Software Industry Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q. J. 555, 574 (2004).
32 See generally Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83
TEX. L. REv. 961 (2005) (describing the role that patents play in the software industry).
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licenses do not appear to meet many of the normal expectations of contract
law.33
Developers promulgated software licenses under the doctrine that
software was different, but in enforcing these licenses the courts did not
rely on that argument. 4 And once the private legislation model of the soft-
ware industry proved profitable and beneficial, other industries began to
adopt private legislation. As a result, licenses are now widely used as a
device to circumvent public legislation.
Owners of intellectual property now use licenses to transfer chattels
without transferring many presumed rights, including the right to transfer
the chattel to another, the right to possession and use without temporal
limit, the right to display the chattel in public,35 and the right to public per-
formance.36 Such circumvention gives intellectual property owners the po-
tential to acquire rights, monopolistic in nature, that can be used to influ-
ence the market and hinder competition, and as long as the owners retain
33 See James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: European
Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 109, 111 n.7 (2003), stating:
"Shrink-wrap" licenses are licenses printed on the packaging of software and other computer
information delivered to licensees in tangible media (e.g., computer diskettes of some kind).
The package is wrapped in a clear-read-through shrink-wrap plastic. The buyer of the com-
puter information is deemed to have assented to the terms of the license by ripping open the
shrink-wrap. "Click-wrap" licenses are licenses shown in electronic form or made available
to users on computer screens to users [sic]. Before the user is permitted to use the online ser-
vice or the computer program, the user must agree to the license terms. The user assents to
the standard terms by clicking with the mouse. The term "click-wrap" arose by analogy to
"shrink-wrap." Online licenses are typically in "click-wrap" form, but there is yet another
form of online license that is asserted: "browse-wrap." The theory of a browse-wrap license
is that the user is informed that use of the Internet site amounts to the user's assent to the
site's stated terms.
34 The same cannot be said for the legislatures. In fact, in 1990 President Bush signed into law the
"Computer Software Rental Amendments Act," publicly endorsing the use of licenses to circumvent the
first sale doctrine with respect to software. See Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 805, 104 Stat. 5089, 5136 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 205 (2000)); see
also 37 C.F.R. § 201.26 (2004) (implementing regulations). Section 109 of the copyright law was
amended to prohibit the rental, lease, or lending of a computer program for direct or indirect commer-
cial gain unless authorized by the owner of copyright in the program, thus placing this circumvention in
the public legislation domain. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000). As to why the publicly-legislated exception to
the first sale doctrine codified in 17 U.S.C. § 109 was limited to software, the only explanation that can
be given is that legislators viewed software as different. How exactly software is different from written
works or musical works or films is unclear. While software may be easier to pirate than, say, a book, the
legal harm in both cases is comparable.
35 When a consumer purchases a piece of artwork, she purchases the right to display the work in
public. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2000). Some artists now limit these rights with a license that includes
terms regulating display of the artwork.
36 With the purchase of a book or a CD, the consumer also purchases the right to read the book
aloud or to play the album on a CD player in the middle of the school cafeteria. See id. Some licenses
now include terms restricting these rights.
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title and do not seek to disguise a sale as a license, courts have been defer-
ential in their approach to these licenses. Such deference has resulted in
further expansion of the private legislation model.
IH. THE PRIVATE LEGISLATION MODEL
Enforcing privately negotiated agreements that circumvent public leg-
islation vitiates the existing statutory scheme of intellectual property pro-
tection. Although there is a strong societal interest in protecting the free-
dom to contract, that freedom is limited. When contracts are used to cir-
cumvent the law, courts simply refuse to enforce them. But the deference
granted by the courts in enforcing licenses does not take into account the
broad impact of the private legislative models in use. Before the norm shifts
to a licensing model, careful consideration must be given to how to balance
the interests of the public and of intellectual property owners in promoting
the development of intellectual property. Licenses have their place, but the
use of licenses to circumvent the first sale doctrine, withhold warranties,
obstruct the on-sale bar, frustrate fair use, and withhold many other rights
from the possessors of chattels must be scrutinized.37 The private legislative
models containing terms that withhold rights from the possessors of chat-
tels promote the agenda of the private interests drafting the licenses. Before
these terms become standard, further thought must be given to their effects.
37 There is another article to be written on the regulation of such clauses. Some have argued that
such licenses should be unenforceable as unconscionable and that use of licenses to circumvent public
legislation frustrates the purpose of the public legislation and such licenses are therefore preempted.
Courts are notoriously reluctant to apply such arguments to contracts. Furthermore, this article does not
argue that these contracts are unconscionable, that they are unenforceable for lack of assent, or that they
are contracts of adhesion. Those arguments have been made before, in the context of software. See Mark
A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1251 (1995)
(citing Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 761 (E.D. La. 1987), afid, 847 F.2d 255
(5th Cir. 1988); Foresight Res. Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (D. Kan. 1989)). This
article also does not address the argument that because a breach of contract claim is a state law claim, to
the extent that the contract claim conflicts with federal intellectual property laws, the state claims are
preempted. See Sandeen, supra note 26, at 154-55; SQL Solutions, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., No. C-91-1079
MHP, 1991 WL 626458 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1991) ("[S]tate law must be applied in a manner that
does not conflict with federal copyright law and policy."). The use of private agreements as discussed in
this article does not conflict with federal intellectual property laws but rather contracts around them. See
Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993). The federal
intellectual property protection system does not dictate how states should govern contracts and licensing
issues relating to the use, distribution, and ownership of intellectual property. There is no express statu-
tory preemption issue. To be sure, allowing the transfer of chattels without the accompanying transfer of
rights frustrates the policy behind the statutory intellectual property system but is not preempted by it.
The role of these arguments remains to be explored further in another article.
LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
This Section delineates several ways that the balance is shifting from pro-
tecting the public interest to protecting the intellectual property owner's
interest.
A. Circumventing the First Sale Doctrine
Under the first sale doctrine, once a chattel that benefits from intellec-
tual property is sold, the intellectual property owner cannot rely on its intel-
lectual property rights to restrict the purchaser's use or redistribution of the
chattel.38 If the chattel is licensed rather than sold, the first sale doctrine
does not apply. The doctrine is "grounded in the common-law principle that
restraints on the alienation of tangible property are to be avoided in the
absence of clear congressional intent to abrogate this principle."3 9 Circum-
vention of this doctrine through private legislation allows intellectual prop-
erty owners to create monopolies that are, so far, seemingly blessed by the
courts through their endorsement of the distinction between licenses and
sales.
The impact of this circumvention on the public's rights is startling. For
example, by licensing instead of selling seed, Monsanto can impose signifi-
cant post-transfer restrictions on the use of the seed, as it did in the McFar-
ling case discussed above, thereby completely vitiating the first sale doc-
trine.' Ten years ago, not a single variety of genetically modified soybean
seed was on the market; today, Monsanto's genetically modified soybean
seed accounts for over 85 percent of all soybean seed planted. 1 Farmers'
rights to the seed they reap are thus significantly diminished when com-
pared to the rights farmers had ten years ago. Monsanto has successfully
defended its license, bringing nearly one hundred lawsuits and receiving
over $15 million in recorded judgments through 2005.42
38 There is one exception. If the product in question is patented, then post-sale restrictions may be
placed on the product if such restrictions are reasonably related to the patent and are less than the scope
of the patent itself. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708-10 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
39 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS OFFICE PURSUANT TO §
104 OFTHE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT vii (2001), available at http:llwww.copyright.gov/re
ports/studies/dmca/sec- 104-report-vol- 1.pdf.
40 See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, No. 4:00CV84 CDP, 2002 WL 32069634 at *3 (E.D. Mo.
Nov. 5, 2002).
41 Roundup Ready soybeans are genetically engineered to withstand the application of an herbi-
cide that kills soybeans. The Roundup Ready seeds were planted on eighty-seven percent of soybean
acreage in the United States last year. Pioneer Hi-Bred is Accused of Price Fixing, GRAND FORKS
HERALD, Feb. 6, 2006, § FRM, available at 2006 WLNR 2038555.
42 Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, Monsanto Assault on U.S. Farmers Detailed in New Report
(Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/press.release 1.13.05.cfm.
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The application of the first sale doctrine differs slightly in the context
of copyright law,43 patent law,' and trademark law, 45 and therefore, the im-
pact on each field is discussed in greater detail below.
1. Copyright Law
"The whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright
owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he
has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution." '46
Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, the U.S. Copyright Act reads in part, "the
owner of a particular copy ... lawfully made under this title ... is entitled,
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession of that copy." 47 The first sale doctrine, as its name indicates,
applies only to lawful owners of a copy, not licensees of a copy. A licensor
has a different set of rights than an owner.
Intellectual property owners, such as Apple, use this distinction to
their advantage, contracting around the statutory restrictions on the limita-
tion of resale rights. When a consumer such as Hotelling48 purchases a song
from Apple's iTunes, he does not purchase a copy of a musical work but
only a limited use license to play the copy for "personal, noncommercial
use" and has no "commercial or promotional use rights" in the music.
4 9
This limited transfer of rights means that Apple or Apple's licensors retain
the title to the copy a user has licensed and control all future distribution
rights. The user has therefore purchased a license to play the copy on his
computer but not the right to resell or otherwise distribute the copy. If the
user had gone to Tower Records and purchased the same musical work on a
CD, for instance, she would have received title to the copy she purchased,
and her future distribution rights would have been protected under the first
sale doctrine. The owner of the CD's copyright, be it Tower Records or a
third party, would have exhausted its right to control the CD's distribution.
Private legislation is used to enhance the intellectual property owner's
rights while restricting the licensee's rights. If a consumer purchases a
piece of art, for example, the copyright owner can restrict the public display
of the work, but no more: the copyright owner may not otherwise restrict
43 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
44 See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
45 Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 1995) (per cu-
riam).
46 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998).
47 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
48 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
49 iTunes Terms of Service, supra note 16.
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the display of the work." If the work is sold, the first sale doctrine gives the
new owner of a copy "the right to display that copy publicly ... to viewers
present at the place where the copy is located" and to transfer the copy
without limitation." However, if a consumer licenses a piece of artwork,
the licensor controls the rights that transfer with the artwork. The license
may restrict the licensee's rights to display and transfer the work. For in-
stance, the artist may wish to prevent the licensee from displaying the art-
work in the licensee's garage or from lending the artwork to a friend. Own-
ers can use private legislation to restrict the licensee's rights in circumven-
tion of public legislation. Such clauses restricting the rights of the licensee
to display or transfer the artwork may be used to circumvent the first sale
doctrine and to augment the rights of the copyright owner in a manner not
envisioned by public legislation.
How did this "critical distinction between statutory rights and contract
rights" come to exist?" Congress enacted the publicly-legislated first sale
doctrine in response to resale limits that copyright owners attempted to
place on their products. 3 17 U.S.C. §109 transfers to the purchaser of a
chattel all rights over distribution, disposition, and transfer of that expres-
sion of the copyright. 4 The first sale doctrine, as the doctrine codified in
§ 109(a) is known, thus places significant limitations on the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner. As codified, however, the doctrine does not
50 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("To perform or display a work "publicly" means: (1) to perform or
display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; (2) to transmit or otherwise communi-
cate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.").
" Id. § 109(a), (c).
52 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 143 (1998) (citing
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908)). As the courts see it, the distinction is that the
statutory prohibition applies to limitations on future sales, whereas licensors are free to impose such
limitations and circumvent the statute because they are not selling the chattel and are therefore not
exhausting their rights to the chattel.
53 For example, in Bobbs-Merrill, the owner of the copyright on a book attempted to restrict the
price at which the book could be resold by placing a notice in the front of each book: "The price of this
book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less [sic] price." 210 U.S. at 341. The
Supreme Court found that allowing such a restriction on the downstream distribution of the book ex-
tended the operation of the copyright statute beyond what the legislators had intended. Id. at 351.
54 Novell, Inc. v. Unicom Sales, Inc., No. C-03-2785 MMC, 2004 WL 1839117, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 17, 2004) (quoting Quality King, 523 U.S. at 152 ("[Tlhe whole point of the first sale doctrine is
that once the copyright (-, ,ner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, [the
owner] has exhausted his ex:: 'sive statutory right to control its distribution.")).
55 Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083, n.10 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(quoting Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d Cir.1991) (citations omitted)
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extend to any person "who has acquired possession of the copy . . . from
the copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without acquiring
ownership of it."56 In codifying the distinction between statutory rights and
contract rights, Congress sought to strike a balance between encouraging
copyright owners to commit the expression of their ideas to the public and
protecting the rights of the public. One way to protect the public interest
was the policy behind the first sale doctrine: prevent copyright owners from
imposing "price or other conditions on the ability of the owner of a copy of
a work to dispose of that copy."57 Allowing circumvention of the first sale
doctrine through contract frustrates the policy behind the first sale doctrine,
as licenses are used to impose price and other restrictions on the rights of
the licensees, and tilts the balance of rights in favor of the copyright owner
and away from the public.
At the time Congress passed Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act,
Congress did not anticipate the expanded use of private legislation and
therefore declined to regulate this important aspect of copyrights. 8 The use
When.. . licenses were first developed for software, it was, in large part, to avoid the federal
copyright law first sale doctrine .... Under this doctrine, one could purchase a copy of a
computer program, and then lease it or lend it to another without infringing the copyright on
the program .... Consumers, instead of purchasing their own copy of the program, would
simply rent a copy of the program, and duplicate it .... [S]oftware producers wanted to sue
the companies that were renting the copies of the program to individual consumers, rather
than the individual consumers. The first sale doctrine, though, stood as a substantial barrier
to successful suit against these software rental companies, even under a theory of contribu-
tory infringement. By characterizing the original transaction between the software producer
and the software rental company as a license, rather than a sale, and by making the license
personal and non-transferable, software producers hoped to avoid the reach of the first sale
doctrine and to establish a basis in state contract law for suing the software rental companies
directly. Questions remained, however, as to whether the use of state contract law to avoid
the first sale doctrine would be preempted either by the federal copyright statute (statutory
preemption) or by the exclusive constitutional grant of authority over copyright issues to the
federal government (constitutional preemption). Congress recognized the problem, and, in
1990, amended the first sale doctrine as it applies to computer programs and phonorecords.
As amended, the first sale doctrine permits only non-profit libraries and educational institu-
tions to lend or lease copies of software and phonorecords. (Under the amended statute, a
purchaser of a copy of a copyrighted computer program may still sell his copy to another
without the consent of the copyright holder.)
56 See Novell, 2004 WL 1839117, at *10 ("Accordingly, the Court finds that the [Agreement] is a
license, rather than a sale, and the first sale doctrine has no application .... ").
57 Letter from Bernard R. Sorkin, Senior Counsel, Time Warner, Inc., to U.S. Copyright Office
and Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmcalcom
ments/InitO29.pdf (regarding the possible effects of Title I of the DMCA on the first sale doctrine as
codified in Section 109 of the Copyright Law).
58 Lemley, supra note 37, at 1282 ("[Tlhe Committee Report to section 109(a) of the Copyright
Act indicates that Congress anticipated that private parties might contract out of a first sale right."
(citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976) ("This does not mean that conditions on future disposition
of copies or phonorecords, imposed by a contract between their buyer and seller, would be unenforce-
able between the parties as a breach of contract, but it does mean that they could not be enforced by an
action for infringement of copyright."))). See also Nadan, supra note 31, at 634, n.268, (citing H.R.
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of private legislation tips the balance of rights in favor of copyright owners,
who retain copyright, retain title to the copy of the work, and receive the
benefits associated with the transfer of the chattel. Although the issue of
private legislation was raised during the drafting of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA"), Congress did not change Section 109, despite
the acknowledgement of concerns relevant to circumventing the first sale
doctrine.59 The DMCA's Executive Summary states that legislators found
"no convincing evidence of present-day problems. In order to recommend a
change in the law, there should be a demonstrated need for the change that
outweighs the negative aspects of the proposal."' However, in some fields
the incentives to circumvent statutory protections have exceeded incentives
to have the ability to bring an action for copyright infringement.6 As a re-
sult, the use of licenses has increased greatly. Yet there has been no market
correction for the lesser transfer of rights associated with a license versus a
sale, as can be seen from the iTunes example-the license fee for an album
on iTunes is about the same as the price for an album at Tower Records.
Market correction, furthermore, will be slow to come because many licen-
sors are unaware that they are purchasing a license, with limited rights,
rather than ownership. Copyright owners now have the ability to profit
from the copyright and to prevent those to whom the tangible expression of
the copyright has transferred from exercising rights that they may expect to
have. As the norm shifts to the use of licenses, the enforceability of terms
whose primary purpose is to circumvent public legislation must be ques-
tioned.
2. Patent Law
Patent protection is usually limited to the first sale, meaning that the
patent holder loses rights to any royalty after the initial sale of the patented
Rep. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976) (relevant section reprinted as "Historical Note" to 17 U.S.C. § 109
(2000)).
59 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS OFFICE PURSUANT TO §
104 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT xv (2001), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-l04-report-vol-l.pdf ("Another prevalent concern
was that licenses are being used increasingly by copyright owners to undermine the first sale doctrine
and restrict other user privileges under the copyright law. These commentators argue that this trend is
displacing the uniformity of federal copyright law with a wide variation of contract terms that must be
evaluated and interpreted. This poses a particular challenge to large institutions, such as universities and
libraries, in determining legal and acceptable use in any given work.").
60 Id. at xx.
61 See generally David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the Copy-
right Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157 (1990).
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product. Therefore, the patent holder does not have any right to control
subsequent sales because the patent rights have been "exhausted." Once a
patent becomes "exhausted" the initial purchaser may resell the goods
without infringing on the patent held by the original seller.62
The main difference between the first sale doctrine in patent law and
copyright law is that the doctrine only applies to unconditional sales of
patented devices.63 Courts have allowed restrictions on the future rights of
the purchaser of a chattel that embodies patented ideas even when the chat-
tel is sold if notice is given of the restrictions, such restrictions are within
the scope of the patent grant, and the patent rights have not yet been ex-
hausted.' Furthermore, if a party violates a restriction on a sale, the patent
holder can sue that party for patent infringement, which is likely to be a
more lucrative action than breach of contract for violating a license restric-
tion.65
The fact that patent owners can place downstream restrictions on sold
chattels that benefit from patented ideas has not prevented the use of private
legislation to regulate downstream use from keeping pace with the use of
such licenses on chattels that benefit from copyrights. The terms in licenses
of chattels that benefit from patents have two primary purposes behind
them: one legitimate and one suspect. Licenses may be used to augment
public legislation by clarifying what restrictions are being placed on the
chattel, or licenses may be used to circumvent public legislation by restrict-
ing the downstream use of the chattel in a manner not commensurate with
the scope of the patent.
The use of licenses to augment public legislation fits the traditional
norm driving contract law. Such licenses are economically efficient, allow-
ing parties to negotiate what restrictions they wish to place on downstream
use and to set the potential outcomes for breach, decreasing the overall
62 Hillary A. Kremen, Caveat Venditor: International Application of the First Sale Doctrine,
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 161, 162 (1997) (citations omitted).
63 B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (1997) ("[An unconditional sale of a
patented device exhausts the patentee's right to control the purchaser's use of the device thereafter. The
theory behind this rule is that in such a transaction, the patentee has bargained for, and received, an
amount equal to the full value of the goods.").
64 See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding limitation to
single use only within field of use); Braun, 124 F.3d at 1426; Ariz. Cartridge Remfrs. Ass'n v. Lexmark
Int'l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding Lexmark's post-sale restrictions on printer car-
tridges).
65 In a suit for patent infringement, "damages may be enhanced up to three times the compensa-
tory award." Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 284
(2000)). In a suit for breach of contract, damages must reflect the intentions of the parties at the time
they entered into the contract and cannot be punitive-in other words, they can only be compensatory.
E. Allan Farnsworth, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8 (C) (2d ed. 1998).
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transaction costs in light of the possibility of future breach. As long as such
restrictions are within the scope of the patent, traditional contract norms
would dictate that they should be enforceable. The parties can thus use the
bargaining process to shift risks in a manner that is in accord with the re-
strictions that could be placed on the same items in a sale.
On the other hand, as long as "the overall effect of the license" does
not "restrain competition unlawfully in an appropriately defined relevant
market,"' a license may be used to circumvent public legislation by placing
downstream restrictions not limited to the scope of the patent grant.67 Patent
owners are choosing to explore this less-defined area of market restraints,
which is why licenses of chattels that embody patented ideas are keeping
pace with licenses that embody other types of intellectual property. As pri-
vate legislation seeks to circumvent established case law on the restraints
available after the first sale of an article that benefits from the protection
given to patents, the balance between public rights and owners' rights tilts
in favor of the owners and away from the public.
3. Trademark Law
The first sale doctrine, as applied to trademarks, limits "the producer's
power to control the resale of its product."68 Under the first sale doctrine,
after the sale of a product that bears a trademark, the trademark owner can-
not rely on its trademark rights to restrict the purchaser's use or redistribu-
tion of the expression.69 So instead of selling chattels, trademark owners
66 Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 706 (quoting Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995,
1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
67 Richard H. Stem, Post-Sale Patent Restrictions After Mallinckrodt-An Idea in Search of
Definition, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 14 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
Consider the doctrine of repair and reconstruction, obliquely involved in the Mallinckrodt
case. Under the patent law, the owner of a product has an unlimited right to repair the prod-
uct by replacing one or more worn or otherwise unsatisfactory parts (elements) of the prod-
uct. Sometimes, however, purchasers of patented devices exasperate patentees by refurbish-
ing the devices instead of buying new ones-even where the patentee makes it clear to the
customers by the construction of the device that the seller expects them to replace worn-out
element A of the combination A + B + C, but not to replace B whey- it wears out. Neverthe-
less, this conduct is not patent infringement, because the Supreme Court has held that the
"mere replacement of individual unpatented parts, one at a time, whether of the same part re-
peatedly or different parts successively, is no more than the lawful right of the owner to re-
pair his property." Hypothesize a case, however, in which the seller labels the device: "Li-
censed for use only until element B wears out." Under the Mallinckrodt decision, that label
would provide a detour around the Supreme Court's rulings on repair.
Id. (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961)).
68 Sebastian Int'l v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 1995).
69 Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("Under
the first sale doctrine, resale by the first purchaser of the original article under the producer's trademark
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have chosen to use the private legislation model and license products bear-
ing trademarks.7" By licensing chattels and using private legislation to cir-
cumvent public legislation, trademark owners are able to control the trade-
mark's use, even after receiving compensation for the chattels.
This use of private legislation allows the owner of the trademark to re-
ceive compensation for the product and still exercise control over it down-
stream.7 Such circumvention erodes the very foundation of the publicly
legislated restrictions on intellectual property, encouraging monopolistic
behavior by the trademark owner.
B. Foiling Fair Use Exceptions
Accompanying a copyright is the right to prevent others from copying
the protected idea, except when such copying is a fair use of the ideas ex-
pressed in the copyrighted work. The "fair use doctrine," as this restriction
is known, is codified in Copyright Act section 107.72 Determining which
uses are fair and which infringe on the rights of the copyright owner can be
difficult and has led copyright owners to challenge the fair use doctrine and
to use private legislation to protect their works.73
With increasing frequency, copyright owners are licensing their copy-
righted works, using private legislation to circumvent the fair use doctrine.
Companies are using such licenses to curtail the rights of licensees-for
instance, both Microsoft and Network Associates have attempted to use
is generally neither trademark infringement nor unfair competition." (citing Sebastian, 53 F.3d at
1074)).
70 Initially, trademark owners sought to contract around the first sale doctrine by placing restric-
tions in the sales contract. Behr Auto., Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Civ. A. No. 85-0295, 1985
WL 6417, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1985). However, that approach failed as courts held that post-sale
restrictions were not enforceable, because the first sale exhausted the trademark owner's rights. McDon-
ald's Corp. v. Shop At Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 801,811 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
71 When McDonald's attempted to do just this, however, the Middle District of Tennessee held
that it would be "inequitable to allow McDonald's to set up a supply chain that shields it from liability
yet allows it to exercise control over the goods while in the supply chain." McDonald's, 82 F. Supp. 2d
at 811-12.
72 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
73 Some uses are fair, while others are clearly not. If someone other than the copyright owner
wishes to include an excerpt from a copyrighted work in a review of the work, such copying is fair use.
If a professor wishes to make a photocopy of a section of a copyrighted work for research for an article
she is working on, public legislation dictates that she should be able to do so. If a satirist wishes to
incorporate some (but not all) elements of a copyrighted work in a parody of that work, public legisla-
tion dictates that she should be able to do so. On the other hand, if one author copies all of another's




licenses to prevent criticism of copyrighted works by licensees. Microsoft
Agent comes with a license clause that prevents users from using the soft-
ware to "disparage Microsoft, its products or services."74 Network Associ-
ates sought to prevent its customers from publishing reviews of Network
Associates' antivirus software." The enforceability of such clauses has not
been tested, but the licensee does not have the same rights as a purchaser.
7 6
Licenses serve two primary purposes in the field of the fair use doc-
trine--one purpose is to augment public legislation, a laudable and legiti-
mate purpose, and the other is to circumvent public legislation, a nefarious
purpose. If the primary purpose of private legislation is to delineate the
agreement reached by the parties and to augment the guidelines of 17
U.S.C. § 107-in other words, that the licensee may not copy more than ten
percent of the article or use the article in more than one presentation with-
out seeking permission from the copyright owner-then the license fits
within traditional contract norms and does not expand the copyright
owner's rights. Such a contract may reduce subsequent enforcement costs
between parties-a legitimate reason for such an agreement. Neither the
public's rights nor the licensee's rights are harmed by this agreement, and
there is a strong public interest in enforcing such private legislation. On the
other hand, if the primary purpose for using private legislation is to circum-
vent the fair use doctrine and restrict the public's rights to copy protected
works, then the license should not be enforced.77 For instance, a license
could state that the licensee cannot copy any part of a copyrighted work,
though such copying may be fair use if the licensee had purchased the
74 License and Distribution Agreement (Microsoft Agent), http://www.microsoft.com/msagent/lic
ensingIDistLicenseV2.asp (last visited July 11, 2006); James Gleick, Fast Forward: It's Your Problem
(Not Theirs), N.Y TIMES, May 10, 1998, § 6, at 16, available at http://www.around.com/agree.html
("The agreement that comes with Microsoft Agent, software that lets users create cute interactive
animated figures, holds that you may not use the characters 'to disparage Microsoft, its products or
services."').
75 Gleick, supra note 74, at 16 ("Customers who download Network Associates' antivirus soft-
ware 'agree'--click--o clauses designed to give the company control of press coverage: 'The customer
shall not disclose the results of any benchmark test to any third party without Network Associates' prior
written approval'; and 'the customer will not publish reviews of the product without prior consent."').
76 The New York Attorney General's office prosecuted Network Associates for including the
language quoted in note 75 supra, which suggested to consumers that a New York statute gave Network
Associates the ability to prosecute consumers for publishing reviews. The court found that no damages
could be determined for this act, but issued a narrowly worded injunction that prohibited Network
Associates from including identical language in future licenses. People v. Network Assocs., Inc., 758
N.Y.S.2d 466, 471 (Sup. Ct. 2003). Network Associates has since changed its license.
77 Many copyright owners view the fair use doctrine as a restriction on the rights of the copyright
owners and not as a public privilege. See Jonathan Rosenoer, Information & Infrastructure,
CYBERLAW, July, 1994, available at http://www.cyberlaw.com/cylw794.html.
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work.78 The licensor could require the licensee to pay a separate royalty to
copy each chapter of a manual, a level of control not permitted under the
fair use doctrine. To enforce such private legislation could have the effect
of granting copyright owners a monopoly in the expression of their ideas,
removing material from the public domain and harming the public. Free-
dom to contract is not unlimited and can be abused. Licenses have the po-
tential to tilt the balance in favor of the reward granted to the copyright
owner and away from the public interest in having copyrighted works even-
tually enter the public domain and thus deserve close scrutiny. It is, there-
fore, crucial to evaluate the purpose behind each license in determining
whether the license should be enforced or not.
One particularly difficult area to determine the true purpose behind the
license and the scope of fair use is the doctrine of reverse engineering.
There is an increased concern among copyright owners that purchasers of
chattels expressing copyrighted ideas are reverse engineering the chattels
and then using that knowledge to vitiate the copyright and circumvent the
ideas expressed in the copyrighted works. It is unclear whether reverse en-
gineering is fair use or not and, therefore, whether it is copyright infringe-
ment or not.79 As a result, copyright owners are licensing their works with
terms that seek to prevent reverse engineering. Some courts have found
such clauses enforceable. ° If a clause preventing reverse engineering
merely reinforces the DMCA's ban on circumvention of technological pro-
tection measures, then the clause should be enforced, as it does not erode
the foundations of copyright law."' However, if a clause preventing reverse
engineering seeks to circumvent the fair use doctrine, and in doing so, it
expands the copyright owner's rights, shifting the balance between the
owner's rights and the public interest, then it should not be enforced.
What the courts have not contemplated in enforcing contract clauses
circumventing the fair use doctrine is the slippery slope facing society.
How is the public interest served by allowing circumvention of the fair use
doctrine through prevention of reverse engineering or through prevention of
disparaging comments on a copyrighted work? How are licensees to be
made aware of the limited rights they acquire with a license as opposed to a
purchase? A balance must be maintained between the rights of the public
and the intellectual property owner, and public legislation needs to reflect
78 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
79 Chris Sprigman, Should Software Companies Be Able Through Contracts, to Prevent Competi-
tors from "Reverse Engineering " Their Products?, Sept. 26, 2002, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.
cor/commentary/20020926_sprigman.html.
80 Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[Clase law indi-
cates the First Circuit would find that private parties are free to contractually forego the limited ability
to reverse engineer a software product under the exemptions of the Copyright Act.").
81 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
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that balance as the courts interpret private legislation. The failure to enforce
limits on the near-monopolistic rights of intellectual property owners will
erode such limits and leave the public at the mercy of monopolies con-
trolled by intellectual property owners.
C. Obstructing the On-Sale Bar
If an invention is on sale more than one year before the inventor files a
patent application, the inventor is statutorily barred from receiving a pat-
ent.82 The publicly-legislated on-sale bar, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102, arises
when the invention is "the subject of a commercial offer for sale."83 "A sale
is 'a contract between parties to give and pass rights of property for consid-
eration which the buyer pays or promises to pay the seller for the thing
bought or sold.""
A corporation may license an invention without triggering the on-sale
bar because it is not selling the invention." A license may commercialize
an invention, but because a license is not a sale, it does not raise the on-sale
bar, creating an incentive for patent owners to privately legislate the trans-
fer of chattels. Patent owners can thus increase profits by testing the market
for products with licenses and filing for patents only on those products that
succeed in the market. 6 Despite this, the courts continue to treat private
legislation that circumvents the on-sale bar as if it did not undermine the
policies behind the bar. For example, in 1985 the Federal Circuit said:
[I]t is important to recognize that exempting licenses under a patent from
the on-sale bar is not inconsistent with traditional policies underlying that
doctrine, including: (1) [the] policy against removing inventions from the
public domain which the public justifiably comes to believe are freely
82 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
83 Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998).
84 Zacharin v. United States, 213 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Caveney, 761
F.2d 671, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
85 Elan v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 366 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("An offer to enter into a
license under a patent for future sale of the invention covered by the patent when and if it has been
developed ... is not an offer to sell the patented invention that constitutes an on-sale bar." (citing In re
Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2002))). The Federal Circuit has "held that merely granting a
license to an invention, without more, does not trigger the on-sale bar of § 102(b)." Kollar, 286 F.3d at
1330-31 (citing Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
86 In addition, it is worth noting that there might be a potentially lucrative impact on the length of
the patent term. The patent term is based on the date of filing, so if the date of filing can be postponed
for a year or two through this practice, then the term may be similarly extended for a year or two. How-
ever, the on-sale bar is not the only bar to patentability, a factor that must be considered in evaluating
this scenario.
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available due to commercialization; (2) [the] policy favoring prompt and
widespread disclosure of inventions to the public; and (3) [the] policy of
giving the inventor a reasonable amount of time following sales activity to
determine whether a patent is worthwhile. 7
Twenty years later, the Federal Circuit still relied on the argument that
a license does not commercialize an invention and therefore does not trig-
ger the on-sale bar:88
[A]lthough an inventor may economically benefit somewhat from licens-
ing his invention at the time of granting the license, such as by up-front
fees or advance royalties, the real benefit from commercializing an inven-
tion occurs when the invention is actually utilized commercially or made
available to the public, and the grant of a license, albeit accompanied by
some payment, is only part of the pre-commercialization process aimed at
making the invention commercial. The on-sale bar is not implicated by
such activities. The grant of a license thus does not conflict with the poli-
cies underlying the on-sale bar.89
Licenses can commercialize an invention. Granted, some agreements
that purport to be licenses are actually sales, some contracts that purport to
be sales are actually licenses, and in both of these cases, it is clear what the
outcome of entering into such an agreement more than a year before filing
for a patent should be.9" However, some licenses have the potential to
commercialize an invention. Monsanto's license of genetically modified
seed9 to McFarling is one such license. This license involved an embodi-
ment of Monsanto's invention that was publicly available, that retarded the
objective of making inventions available to the public, and that provided
87 Kollar, 286 F.3d at 1333-34 (citing Caveney, 761 F.2d at 676) (citations omitted).
88 It is worth noting that a simple disguise of a "sales price as a licensing fee... would not avoid
triggering the on-sale bar." Elan, 366 F.3d at 1341.
89 Kollar, 286 F.3d at 1334.
90 Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047-48 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("There may
be instances in which a license is tantamount to a sale, and in which a bar may arise from a license.
When a product, such as a computer program, is transferred to a customer in a transaction that is tanta-
mount to a sale, the transaction may under commercial law nevertheless still be a license. The transac-
tion is structured as a license (a "shrink wrap" license) so that the seller can restrict what the "buyer"
does with the program, in particular, to ensure that it is not duplicated and distributed to others who
have not paid the seller for the product. The product is, however, just as immediately transferred to the
"buyer" as if it were sold. Notwithstanding the provisions of such a license, it is not contemplated that
the product will ever be returned to the seller.").
91 The seed was patented and the on-sale bar was never an issue here, but this provides an excel-
lent example of what could happen.
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economic benefits to Monsanto.92 At the same time, this license was not
tantamount to a sale and thus does not fit the Uniform Commercial Code's
definition of a sale.93 According to the Federal Circuit such a license could
not trigger the on-sale bar, despite its commercialization of the invention.
Rather than distinguish between licenses and sales, courts could better
serve the public by looking at whether the invention is the subject of a
commercial offer and whether the invention is ready for patenting. The
circumvention of the on-sale bar is inconsistent with the policy behind the
on-sale bar, allowing the inventor to benefit from making its work available
to the public before providing the public with the benefit of the publication
of its invention. The language governing a transaction should not regulate
the patentability of an article. Even if a license is not tantamount to a sale,
if the intent is to commercialize the invention, the publicly-legislated on-
sale bar should apply.
D. Withholding Warranties
The traditional model of contract law is an agreement between two
parties reached after a process of negotiation and bargaining.94 However,
with respect to routine transactions, such as the sale of goods, transaction
costs associated with negotiation often outweigh the sale's benefits, result-
ing in the completion of the transaction without the protection afforded by
the bargaining process. Recognizing the absence of such protections and
their necessity, the Uniform Commercial Code publicly legislated protec-
tion for merchants purchasing goods.95 These protections include an implied
warranty of merchantability and an implied warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose.97 Providing an incentive for private legislation, parties can
contract around these warranties; however, if they choose to do so, such
exclusions must be both reasonable and made clear during negotiations.98
92 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
93 "A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." U.C.C. § 2-
106(1) (1998).
94 E. Allan Farnsworth, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTs 295-6 (3d ed. 2003); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 341 (8th ed. 2004).
95 Other routine transactions are not subject to U.C.C. Article 2, and are therefore not given this
same level of protection. U.C.C. § 2-106 states that "[iun this Article unless the context otherwise re-
quires 'contract' and 'agreement' are limited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods."
U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1998).
96 Id. § 2-314.
97 Id. § 2-315.
98 Id. § 2-316.
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When a good is licensed, however, it is not sold, and license agreements
carry with them no implied warranties. 99
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that a license is not a sale of
goods"° and therefore the UCC is inapplicable, endorsing the idea that chat-
tels may be transferred without transferring all rights, such as warranties
associated with the transfer of chattel, and thus private legislation may be
used to circumvent public legislation.'
Expansion of the use of licenses in the transfer of chattels has also led
to an expansion of the scope of such licenses. As a result of the incentives
provided by the courts in their distinctions between sales and licenses and
in their willingness to allow parties to contract around warranties, warranty
disclaimers have been appearing with increasing breadth and frequency in
99 Nonetheless, several states interpret Article 2 of the U.C.C. to apply to transactions not involv-
ing the sale of goods. See, e.g., Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979); Owens v.
Patent Scaffolding Co., 354 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948
(App. Div. 1975). Some states apply Article 2 by analogy to cases involving "the same considerations
that gave rise to the Code provisions." Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 514 P.2d 1184,
1190 (Idaho 1975) (quoting Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning,
65 COLUM. L. REv. 880, 888 (1965)). Furthermore, most states have adopted Article 2A, which war-
rants leases of goods. However, leases are not licenses, and at the time Article 2A was drafted and
adopted, software developers argued that software was intangible and therefore should not be covered
by Article 2A. Pamela Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl, How Tensions Between Intellectual Property Policy
and UCITA are Ukely to Be Resolved, in ECOMMERCE: STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS IN THE DIGrrAL
ECONOMY 741, 753-54 (Practicing Law Inst. 1999). Instead, it was argued, a separate Article should be
drafted to address licenses. Id. This was Article 2B, but it was never adopted. Id. Article 2B was never
endorsed by the American Law Institute ("ALr'), and therefore never codified as part of the U.C.C.
Undaunted, the forces behind Article 2B pushed forward with a new freestanding Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act ("UCITA"), which was adopted only by Virginia and Maryland, and
which incorporates many of the provisions contemplated by Article 2B. Few states have applied either
Article 2 or Article 2A to licenses, even licenses of goods, except by analogy. See, e.g., Upper Deck Co.
v. Breakey Int'l, No. 03 Civ.8978 MGC, 2004 WL 2980190, at *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2004).
100 Lamle v. Mattel, Inc., 394 F.3d 1355, 1359, n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[A] license for intellectual
property . . . is not a sale of goods.") (citing Novamedix, Ltd. v. NDM Acquisitions Corp., 166 F.3d
1177, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
'01 Novamedix, 166 F.3d at 1182 ("The world of commercial transactions is not limited to the
binary world ... in which an agreement that passes title to Article 2 goods must be either a contract for
sale of goods or a contract for sale of services. Many commercial transactions are not governed by
Article 2 of the UCC: sale of land or securities, assignment of a contract right, or granting a license
under a patent or copyright, to name just a few. The mere fact that title to Article 2 goods changes hands
during one of these transactions does not by that fact alone make the transaction a sale of goods.").
Previously, in the same Novamedix opinion, the Federal Circuit stated:
[I]f the language of the agreement reflects an intention of the parties to create a contract for
the sale of goods, their intention should be given effect. If the parties intended the settlement
agreement to be a contract for the sale of goods, then by law they intended to include war-
ranties of fitness and merchantability, since the New York UCC implies those warranties in




licenses. Such clauses neither have to be reasonable nor do they have to be
made clear during negotiations. In fact, they do not have to be included at
all-but Apple's iTunes Terms of Service contains one example of such a
disclaimer:
You expressly agree that your use of, or inability to use, the service is at your sole risk. The
service and all products and services delivered to you through the service are (except as ex-
pressly stated by Apple) provided "as is" and "as available" for your use, without warranties
of any kind, either express or implied, including all implied warranties of merchantability,
fitness for a particular purpose, title, and no infringement.'
0 2
This clause limits the exposure of the rights owner, allowing it to con-
trol litigation risk factors. In an industry not adequately covered by statu-
tory schemes, such as software once was, it may have been sensible to en-
force such provisions that trade away risk to help the unprotected industry
attract investment and grow. But in a more developed field, such as art or
music, with sufficient statutory protection through patent, trademark, or
copyright law, this tradeoff becomes questionable. It remains unanswered
whether or not such a provision that lacks the notification required of a
warranty disclaimer in a sale of goods is enforceable. At a minimum, the
inclusion of such a term deters the chattel's possessor from seeking satis-
faction from the owner of the rights in the chattel should it fail. 3
E. Effects of Bankruptcy
Another right affected by the use of private legislation to transfer chat-
tels without title is the right to continue using the chattel upon a bankruptcy
declaration by the title owner. As described above, a license gives a right to
use a chattel, title to which the owner retains. In most licenses of chattels,
neither the intellectual property owner nor the consumer considers license
revocation. However, upon a declaration of bankruptcy by the intellectual
property owner, a debtor may have the right to terminate the license and
sell the property subject to the license.
In an analogous matter involving the rights of a lessee upon the les-
sor's bankruptcy, the Seventh Circuit held that the courts could terminate
the rights of any lessee in a bankruptcy matter and sell the property subject
to the lease, and the only recourse for the lessee would be compensation
102 iTunes Terms of Service, supra note 16.
103 The enforceability of these clauses has been discussed but not settled with regards to software.
See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v.
Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993); Lemley, supra note 37, at 1252.
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"for the value of its leasehold-typically from the proceeds of the sale."'"
The licensee, however, must take steps to protect its interests in order to
obtain such compensation, and presumably would become an unsecured
creditor when seeking recourse after a declaration of bankruptcy. This sce-
nario has not yet been litigated in the area of licenses, but some hypothesize
that the reasoning of the lessor's bankruptcy scenario could extend to cover
the rights of a licensee."°5 If, instead of licensing the chattel, the consumer
purchased it, then title would transfer to the consumer and bankruptcy of
the intellectual property owner would have no impact on the consumer's
rights in the chattel. This is one more right a licensee gives up when it ex-
changes consideration for transfer of a chattel without all of the accompa-
nying rights.
F. Further Restrictions on Proprietary Rights
In addition to the limitations detailed above, owners of intellectual
property are using licenses to impose numerous additional limitations on
those to whom chattels are transferred without the accompanying title. Such
licenses not only restrict the rights of licensees, but also extend the copy-
right owner's rights in potentially lucrative ways. Clauses containing such
restrictions are often found when intellectual property owners feel that the
value of the expression of the protected idea exceeds the reward promised
by public legislation.
One such clause is a limit on the ability of the licensee to transfer the
copyrighted material to another, whether that transfer is temporally limited
or not. The introduction to this Article described such a term in the license
under which the Maryland Lawyer's Manual is distributed.1"6 As justifica-
tion for these terms, copyright owners argue, for instance, that limiting the
ability to distribute the Maryland Lawyer's Manual protects State Bar
members' privacy. However, in addition to protecting the privacy of its
members-an unlikely outcome at best-the license also has the potential
104 Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, Inc., 327 F.3d 537, 548 (7th Cir. 2003).
105 Peter N. Tamposi, Tenants Beware-Your Lease Rights May Be Subject to Termination by the
Bankruptcy Court, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 30 (2003), available at http://www.allbusiness.com/peri
odicals/article/1088173-1 .html. See Warren E. Agin, Here Today and Gone Tomorrow: Section 365 and
the Unfortunate Intellectual Property Licensee, 1 No. 9 ANDREws BANKR. LITIG. REP. 4 (August 27,
2004), available at http://www.swiggartagin.com/articles/code_365n.pdf.
106 That license prohibited one from "reselling, loaning, or giving away the book." Woellert, supra
note 3, at 8.
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to increase the number of copies of the Manual sold by circumventing the
first sale restriction.107
The 1859 Agreement that purchasers of the Dun & Bradstreet Reports
signed in order to receive the books is an early example of an owner using
private legislation to circumvent public legislation for its own economic
benefit:
On February 1, 1859 The Mercantile Agency's Reference Books, of the United States and
British Provinces: Containing Ratings of the Principal Wholesale Merchants (Together with
Some Retailers) and Manufacturers for the Year 1859 appeared on the market .... The con-
tract [subject to which the book was distributed] obligated the subscriber to keep the book on
the designated premises of the firm, in a secure place, available without notice on the call of
the Agency representative, and to surrender the book at the end of the year's subscription to
the Agency. Not only did the subscriber agree to keep the book secure, he also pledged to
keep the information confidential. [The Agency] even equipped the volumes with lock and
key. 108
Other owners who view their proprietary information as being more
valuable than the protections granted by public legislation have placed
other restrictions on licensees' rights. For instance, licensees of GloFish, a
genetically modified form of Zebra fish that have a fluorescent glow, are
prevented from encouraging the GloFish to propagate."°9 This license is
modeled after the licenses used for agricultural goods, with a distinct dif-
ference: the purpose of purchasing agricultural goods is propagation. When
Monsanto licenses its seed, it prevents the licensee from using the progeny
for unauthorized purposes." But unlike GloFish, Monsanto does not at-
tempt to prevent licensees from propagating the seed in the first place. The
purpose of purchasing GloFish is to display them, and the licensor therefore
seeks to transfer only those rights necessary for the licensee to display the
GloFish. The fish are not shipped sterile, and it may be difficult for the li-
107 For instance, what if instead of the Maryland Lawyers Manual, it was J.K. Rowling who sought
to license her books, thereby restricting the right of licensees, including libraries, to loan the books to
others?
108 JAMEs D. NORRIs, R.G. DUN & Co., 1841-1900: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CREDIT-REPORTING IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 53-54 (1978).
109 The GloFish license agreement reads, in part:
By accepting these fish, and as part of the consideration therefor [sic], the recipient agrees:
(1) not to, breed or propagate these fish, permit or encourage others to breed or propagate
these fish, or otherwise intentionally engage in any activity that may result in or lead to the
breeding or propagation of these fish by anyone without the express written consent of York-
town; (2) not to sell or transfer these fish to anyone in the State of California, or to possess or
otherwise engage in any activity that results in the possession of these fish in the State of
California.
Yorktown Technologies, L.P., GloFish Fluorescent Fish License Notice, available at http://www.glofish
.com/license.htm.
110 See supra note I I and accompanying text.
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censees to prevent propagation and therefore to avoid breaching the con-
tract. Given the nature of fish, the licensee may breach the contract's terms
simply by displaying several fish in the same tank.
Intellectual property owners are limiting the proprietary rights that are
transferred with chattels and in so doing are hindering the progress of sci-
ence and the useful arts. For example, artists will no longer be able to take
their "form[] from the lines of life itself, [and watch that form as it] twists
and extends and accumulates and spits and drips and is heavy and coarse
and blunt and sweet and stupid as life itself.""' 1 This discussion above cov-
ers only a few of the many examples of licensing terms limiting proprietary
rights." 2 The balance continues to be skewed in favor of intellectual prop-
erty owners and against potential licensees, hindering progress and frustrat-
ing the purposes of both private and public legislation.
III. PRIVATELY-LEGISLATED TRANSFER OF RIGHTS: LICENSE OR SALE?
Private legislation has tilted the balance between the rights of owners
and the rights of users towards owners by augmenting owners' rights, re-
stricting users' rights, and circumventing public legislation. These advan-
tages have induced intellectual property owners to expand the scope of li-
censes ever further and characterize as licenses transactions that may, in
fact, be sales. "In certain situations, a 'license'...may be tantamount to a
sale.""' 3 Licenses that fall under this subterfuge are shams-seeking to
111 CLAES OLDENBURG, STORE DAYS: DOCUMENTS FROM THE STORE, 1961, AND RAY GUN
THEATER, 1962 (1967).
112 For instance, Rodgers & Hammerstein prevents their licensees from changing the gender or
race of characters in their performances. R&H Theatricals, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.mh.com/theatricals/index.php?page=faqs (last visited July 8, 2006) ( "Changing the show,
by making alterations in the music, lyrics, book, gender of a character, orchestrations or vocal arrange-
ments, is a violation of the author's rights."). Cf. Ylan Q. Mui, Colorblind Casting Roils "Big River":
Licensing Group Objects to Md. School's Musical, WASH. POST, May 21, 2005, at BOI
("[U]ntraditional reverse casting has provoked the ire of the Rodgers and Hammerstein Organization,
which licenses the rights to the musical created by Roger Miller. It forbade the teenagers to perform the
song 'Muddy Water' from the musical that was broadcast last night on C-SPAN . . . 'That's taking a
liberty that one could argue is not appropriate to what the authors of that musical are trying to convey
about the novel,' said Bert Fink, spokesman for R&H Theatricals. 'To ignore the racial component of
Huck Finn does a disservice to the story.' . . . 'The ethnicity of the characters of Huckleberry Finn and
Jim cannot be questioned,' wrote Charles Scatamacchia, director of professional licensing for R&H, in a
letter to Cappies co-founder Judy Bowns. 'Huck is clearly a free, white boy and Jim is clearly a black
slave."').
113 In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1331 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The example given by the court of such
a situation was "a standard computer software license." Id.
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place restrictions on consumers when such restrictions are not enforceable
due to the many publicly-legislated rights described in this Article.
The problem with sham licenses is the chilling effect that they have on
risk-averse, rule-abiding customers. It can be very difficult for consumers
to determine whether they are buying or licensing chattels, particularly
when faced with a confusing agreement such as the one in the recent Lex-
mark case, which stated: "Opening of this package ... confirms your ac-
ceptance of the following license agreement. The [item] is sold at a special
price subject to a restriction that it made be used only once.""' 4 Is the
agreement a sale or a license, and what rights transfer along with the chat-
tel? Applying the traditional normative justifications for the protection of
contract interests to agreements governing the transfer of chattel can help
determine what the principal purpose of the agreement is, and therefore
what rights transfer. Several factors are relevant:
* What are the terms of the contract?
* What is the nature of the intellectual property and the character of
the commercial embodiment? "'
* How is the pricing structured, what rights are transferred, and when
does the transfer take place?"6
* What is the intellectual property owner's established policy or mar-
keting program of maintaining its intellectual property?".7
The below discussion analyzes these factors.
A. The Terms of the Contract
The first step to take in determining whether a contract is a license or a
sale is to evaluate the contract's terms. To "determine the terms of a con-
tract a court must ascertain the parties' intent based on the language they
114 Ariz. Cartridge Remfrs. Ass'n v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981, 983 (emphasis added).
115 Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified,
sub nom. Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
116 Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873) ("[W]hen the patentee, or the person having his
rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its
use and he parts with the right to restrict that use .... That is to say, the patentee or his assignee having
in the act of sale received all the royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in
that particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser without further restriction.").
Cf Microsoft Corp. v. Dak Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d 1091, 1095 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995).
117 See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (listing fifteen doctrinal criteria pertinent to deter-
mining a reasonable royalty when no established royalty exists).
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used." ' The terms reflect the "language, content and intent" of the con-
tract, and the courts will correspondingly consider these in delineating the
nature and the scope of the contract."9
If the contract's plain meaning is unambiguous, then courts will up-
hold that interpretation and treat the agreement as a license or a sale." It is
common, however, for the plain meaning of a transaction to be difficult to
determine and to differ from at least one party's characterization of the
transaction. 2' Even when a contract expressly states that it is a license or it
is a sale, the "circumstances surrounding the transaction" may contradict
the express language of the document, and so courts must look to the sub-
stance of the agreement, not merely its language.'22 Furthermore, "no par-
ticular language is required to be present in order for an offer of a license to
constitute an offer for sale of the licensed product."'2 3
In order to determine the contract's terms, the court will determine by
an objective standard whether there was a meeting of minds between the
parties and what the parties agreed upon.2 "Mutual assent is the bedrock of
118 Consarc Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 996 F.2d 568, 573 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Slatt v.
Slatt, 447 N.E.2d 1099, 1100 (N.Y. 1985)).
119 Nadan, supra note 31 at 611 (quoting Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp.
2d 1051, 1055-56 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("The Court looks to the language, content, and intent of the [con-
tract], in determining whether its terms affect a sale or license of the software.")). See generally Rice,
supra note 61.
120 Novamedix, Ltd. v. NDM Acquisition Corp., 166 F.3d 1177, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("In inter-
preting a contract, '[w]ords and phrases are given their plain meaning. Rather than rewrite an unambi-
guous agreement, a court should enforce the plain meaning of that agreement."' (quoting Am. Express
Bank Ltd. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 164 A.D.2d 275, 277 (N.Y. 1990))).
121 See Novell, Inc. v. Unicom Sales, Inc., No. C-03-2785, 2004 WL 1839117, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 17, 2004) (citing United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1977)).
122 Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2001). The
court must look at "the substance rather than the form of licensing agreements." Id. (citing Rice, supra
note 61). Several courts have held license agreements to be sales. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v.
Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1991); Downriver Internists v. Harris Corp., 929 F.2d 1147,
1150 (6th Cir. 1991); RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1985); Applied
Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149, 155 (E.D.N.Y.1997); Novell, Inc. v. CPU Distrib. Inc., No.
H-97-2326, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9975, at *8 n.4 (S.D. Tex. May 4, 2000).
123 Elan Corp., PLC v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 366 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(3) (1981)).
124 Amber Hatfield Rovner, Practical Guide To Application Of (Or Defense Against) Product-
Based Infringement Immunities Under the Doctrines of Patent Exhaustion and Implied License, 12 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 227, 276 (2004) ("[T]he Federal Circuit held in Jazz Photo Corp. that the "single use
only" wording on the disposal cameras was descriptive rather than an enforceable contractual restriction
because there was no evidence of a "meeting of the minds" where the purchaser (and those obtaining the
purchaser's discarded camera for refurbishing and resale) understood that the patentee licensed the
disposable camera for use with a single roll of film.") (citing Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n.,
264 F.3d 1094, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
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any agreement to which the law will give force." '25 The parties' intent may
be difficult to ascertain from the evidence, and the court may be forced to
extrapolate intent from an evaluation of the relevant terms of the contract.
1 26
In addition, intent may be shaped by assumptions at the time the parties
entered into a contract. These assumptions include knowledge of industry
custom, 27 trade usage, 28 the course of dealings between the parties, 29 and
the commercial relationship between the parties. 3 ' "Merely labeling a
transaction as a lease or license does not control."''
B. The Nature of the Intellectual Property and the Character of its Com-
mercial Embodiment
In order to determine the intent of the parties, the court must do more
than look at the contract's terms. It must also look at the context of the con-
tract--evaluating the nature of the intellectual property, the duration of the
contract, the duration of the term of the intellectual property, and the char-
acter of its commercial embodiment.'32
The nature of the intellectual property is reflected in the ideas and ex-
pression of such ideas addressed by the agreement's terms. What features
of the chattel does the contract's language address, what is the nature of the
125 Softman, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1087 (quoting Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 150 F. Supp.
2d 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y.2001)).
126 Id. at 1085 ("The Court finds that the circumstances surrounding the transaction strongly sug-
gests that the transaction is in fact a sale rather than a license.").
127 Rice, supra note 61, at 172.
128 Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (quoting
RAYMOND NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, § 1.18[l], 1-103 (1992)); Rice, supra note
61.
129 Rice, supra note 61, at 172. One court took particular note of the fact that the patentee had a
general policy of not licensing to its competitors, and therefore, would be reluctant to license the patent
to a strong competitor who had a reputation for price cutting in order to obtain enhanced market share.
Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. 95-218, 1998 WL 151411 (D. Del. Mar. 13, 1998).
Courts will interpret the intent of the parties as well as the language of any document purported to be an
offer for a license in determining whether the offer is truly an offer to license the patent or merely an
offer for sale of the patented product.
130 In Softman, one factor that played into the court's determination that the contract was a sale and
not a license was the fact that "Adobe sells its software to distributors." Softman, 171 F. Supp. 2d at
1086. In other words, the commercial relationship between the parties is that of retailer to retailer, an
unlikely set-up for a license. See Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, sub nom. Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d
295 (2d Cir. 1971) (listing as a relevant factor in determining the royalty of a license whether "they are
competitors in the same territory in the same line of business, or... inventor and promoter.").
131 Softman, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (quoting NIMMER, supra note 128, at § 1.18[l], 1-103).
132 Georgia-Pacific, 318F. Supp. at 1120.
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device, and how is it designed?'33 if the agreement between the parties ex-
ists to protect an asset, such as a trade secret or other subject matter not
subject to the same level of protection as other intellectual property assets,
then a court is more likely the find the agreement is a license and not a sale.
Further, if the agreement exists to protect an asset that is easily imitable or
reproducible, such as a plant or software program, then the agreement is
more likely to be enforceable as a license.'
What is the duration of the term of protection of the intellectual prop-
erty relative to the term of the contract? "' Is the contract term for a shorter
period of time than the duration of the protection term?'36 This corresponds
to the traditional definition of a license. Or is the contract a perpetual li-
cense, one with no limits as to its duration, requiring no renewal? If so, then
the contract is more likely to be construed as a sale.' 7
Is the product one with established profitability and demonstrable
commercial success, and does the price set forth in the contract reflect the
costs of a sale or a license of the product?'38 Is the product one that would
lend itself to being licensed (e.g., is it extremely expensive to purchase,
readily reusable, and something that one might only need for a short
time)?'39 Or is it perishable, inexpensive, or a single-use item and thus more
likely to be sold? 4° Has a market developed to manufacture or service the
item that the intellectual property owner may wish to control? 4' Is there a
133 See generally John W. Osborne, A Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A Standard Based on
Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 643 (2004).
134 See also Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(citing Rice, supra note 61, at 172) (delineating factors to evaluate in determining whether a software
agreement is a license or a sale, including "licenses under which the use restrictions principal purpose is
to protect intangible copyrightable subject matter, and not to preserve property interests in individual
program copies.").
135 See Softman, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 ("The Court finds that the circumstances surrounding the
transaction strongly suggests that the transaction is in fact a sale rather than a license .... The license
runs for an indefinite term without provisions for renewal."); Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
136 One example might be chattel that benefits from a patent with fifteen years of protection left-
if the contract is for five years then the owner of the chattel probably did not envision transferring
complete ownership in the chattel to the purchaser.
137 Softnan, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1085; Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, sub nor. Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc.,
446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
138 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
139 One example would be a fetal Doppler monitor, for use during a pregnancy. Such an item has
limited home use (six months), is relatively expensive, and can easily be reused. This is a classic exam-
ple of an item that lends itself readily to being licensed, as opposed to being sold.
140 For instance, a bag of potato chips.
141 Fred von Lohman speculates that auto manufacturers may someday seek to license cars to
consumers and require licensees to use certified mechanics to modify the cars and certified parts to
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secondary market for used chattels?' 42 Would selling or licensing the intel-
lectual property promote the other assets of the intellectual property owner?
143 These questions should be answered in determining the parties' intent.
C. The Pricing Structure, Rights Transferred, and Timing of the Contract
Despite that fact that the parties to a contract may have signed a
document that "labels itself a 'license' and calls the payments 'royalties,"'
if the reality of the exchange indicates otherwise, courts will find, at the
minimum, that it is a question of fact whether the transaction was a sale or a
license.'" The economic context of the exchange reflects the circumstances
of the transaction and the circumstances surrounding the transaction.'45
These circumstances include the rights that are transferred, the considera-
tion exchanged for those rights, and the timing of this transfer.'
What rights are transferred under the agreement? "' Have sufficient
rights been transferred so as to constitute a sale? 14' If the agreement places
no restrictions on use of the chattel and the product can be transferred, cop-
ied, sold, reverse-engineered, etc., then it is likely that complete ownership
of the product has transferred and that the parties intended a sale. But if
there are redistribution restrictions,'49 geographic restraints, 5° or strictures
repair the cars. J.D. Biersdorfer, By Tearing Open That Cardboard Box, Are You Also Signing on the
Dotted Line?, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 3, 2005, at C4.
142 It is not clear which way this factor will cut, but it is a factor to be considered. The intellectual
property owner may wish to control the price of its product and prevent it from being resold, as in the
iTunes example, and therefore seek to license consumers. On the other hand, consumers may wish to
take advantage of that secondary market, as in the case of music, and seek to purchase the chattel rather
than license it. See Microsoft Corp. v. Dak Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d 1091, 1095 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995).
143 Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified,
sub nom. Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
144 Applied Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
145 See, e.g., Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 16 (1913) ("[I]n view of the facts certified in
this case, as to what took place concerning the article in question, it is a perversion of terms to call the
transaction in any sense a license to use the invention.").
146 See Osborne, supra note 133; Rice, supra note 61.
147 Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("The[]
numerous restrictions imposed ... indicate a license rather than a sale because they undeniably interfere
with the reseller's ability to further distribute the software.").
148 Osborne, supra note 133; see also Microsoft Corp. v. Dak Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d 1091, 1095 n.2
(9th Cir. 1995); Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(citing Rice, supra note 61, at 172) (delineating factors to evaluate in determining whether a software
agreement is a license or a sale).
149 For instance, Adobe sells its software products both as individual products and as bundled
suites. A purchaser of a license to use the suite is prohibited from selling the individual components
separately. Upon purchase of a suite, the purchaser agrees to a license that permits transfer of all rights
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about reverse-engineering the product or copying it,'' then the parties have
transferred only limited rights, and the agreement is more likely a license.,52
One clear indication that the transferred rights are limited in their scope is
language to the effect that "any rights not expressly granted are re-
served."' 53 Is the "user... required to return the copy to the vendor after the
expiration of a particular period"? 11 If so, the contract is more likely a
license; if not, a sale.
What consideration do the parties exchange for the transferred rights?
How does the consideration compare to that in other contracts?'55 Is the
transaction a "lump sum sale" 156 or a series of payments,'57 perhaps struc-
tured as a royalty rate paid per usage? .. An example of a lump sum sale
might occur when "the purchaser. . . obtains a single [product] for a single
"to the Use of the Software to another person or legal entity provided that (a) [the user] also transfer [the
license], the Software and all other software or hardware bundled or pre-installed with the Software."
Softman, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.
150 Novell, Inc. v. Unicorn Sales, Inc., No. C-03-2785, 2004 WL 1839117, at * 11 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
17, 2004) (citations omitted) ("The agreement grants the right to use the software ... only within the
customer's organization .... The limited rights... as set forth in the [agreement] describe a license...
rather than a sale.").
151 An agreement characterized as a sale by the parties was found to be a license and not a sale by
the court when the agreement "prohibited the licensee from copying or duplicating" the products.
Novell, 2004 WL 1839117, at *9 (citing United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1977)). In
Novell, the license permitted copying of the product "for use only by [the licensing parties'] students
and employees." Novell, 2004 WL 1839117, at *9.
152 See also Softman, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (citing Rice, supra note 61, at 172) (delineating
factors to evaluate in determining whether a software agreement is a license or a sale, including "li-
censes under which subsequent transfer is neither prohibited nor conditioned on obtaining the licensor's
prior approval (only subject to a prohibition against rental and a requirement that any transfer be of the
entity.)"). An agreement characterized as a sale by the parties was found to be a license and not a sale
when the agreement "purported to transfer only limited rights for the exhibition or distribution of the
films for a limited purpose and for a limited time." Novell, 2004 WL 1839117, at *9 (citing Wise, 550
F.2d at 1190).
153 Cf. Novell, 2004 WL 1839117, at *11 (citing Adobe, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1091) ("The agreement
expressly states that any rights not expressly granted are reserved to Novell .... The limited rights in
the software, as set forth in the Software License, describe a license in the software, rather than a sale.").
154 Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (quoting
NIMMER, supra note 128, at § 1.18[1], 1-103).
155 Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified,
sub non. Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
156 Softman, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1085.
157 See also id. at 1086 (citing Rice, supra note 61, at 172 (delineating factors to evaluate in deter-
mining whether a software agreement is a license or a sale, including "pricing and payment schemes
that are unitary not serial.")).
158 Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873); Softman, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 ("If a transaction
involves a single payment giving the buyer an unlimited period in which it has a right to possession, the
transaction is a sale.").
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price, which the purchaser pays at the time of the transaction, and which
constitutes the entire payment for the 'license.""59 Is the agreement struc-
tured around the quantity of units exchanged or the duration of the chattel's
use?"6 The stronger the relationship between the exchange of consideration
and the transfer of rights, the more likely it is that the nature of the contract
reflects that relationship.
The timing of the exchange is one aspect of the analysis of the rela-
tionship between the exchange of consideration and the transfer of rights.
"The transfer of a product for consideration with a transfer of title and risk
of loss generally constitutes a sale.' 6' If a single product is exchanged for a
single sum of consideration and at the time of the exchange all rights and
risks associated with that product are also exchanged, then the exchange is
presumed to be a sale.'62 If at the time of the exchange the risk of loss and
the right of ownership were not exchanged, the contract may be a license. If
the contract states that all chattels must be returned or destroyed at the "ex-
piration of the contract term," then only a limited ownership has trans-
ferred, not the rights in the product, and the agreement should be construed
as a license.'63 Even if the agreement states that it is a license, if the situa-
tion is such that "[tihe product is ... just as immediately transferred to the
'buyer' as if it were sold," then the agreement should be construed as a sale
and not as a license. 164
D. Protection and Maintenance of Intellectual Property
Does the owner license others to use the intellectual property, or does
it grant licenses only under special conditions designed to preserve the in-
159 Softman, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1085.
160 Microsoft Corp. v. Dak Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d 1091, 1095 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995).
161 Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing
VWP of Am., Inc. v. United States, 175 F.3d 1327, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
162 Softman, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 ("The Court finds that the circumstances surrounding the
transaction strongly suggests that the transaction is in fact a sale rather than a license. For example, the
purchaser commonly obtains a single copy of the software, with documentation, for a single price,
which the purchaser pays at the time of the transaction, and which constitutes the entire payment for the
'license."').
163 See Novell, Inc. v. Unicorn Sales, Inc., No. C-03-2785, 2004 WL 1839117, at *9, *11 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 17, 2004) (citing United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1977)). An agreement
characterized as a sale by the parties, was found to be a license and not a sale by the court when the
agreement "required the return of the [products] at the expiration of the contract term." Wise, 550 F.2d
at 1190. A separate agreement was found to be a license when the agreement "expressly requires return
or destructions of the software if the license is terminated." Id.
164 In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark
Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Lourie, J., concurring)).
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tellectual property? 165 If the owner has previously sold chattels and never
before engaged in a license, then it is presumed that additional agreements
are also for the sale of chattels. But this is only a presumption; proper evi-
dence-for example, that the owner harbored concerns about a particular
consumer and thus did not wish to transfer rights to that consumer-may
disprove it.
E. Economic Realities
"It is well-settled that in determining whether a transaction is a sale, a
lease, or a license, courts look to the economic realities of the exchange."'
Even after analyzing all of the issues described above, whether an agree-
ment is construed as a license or a sale will turn on each agreement's eco-
nomic realities. The purpose of contract law is to provide, in advance of
any dispute, predictable outcomes for negotiating parties. Delineating the
economic realities is a difficult proposition, and courts' clarity can aid con-
sumers in the negotiating process and help assure that if the parties both
have bargaining power, there will be some understanding of the terms of
the bargained-for exchange. In order to reduce the chilling effect of the
unknown, parties should carefully consider these factors when they draft
and review contracts. It may be beneficial, at times, to enter into a license,
but consumers should be aware of their rights and the fact that they are only
acquiring possession of the chattel, not of the title nor of the rights accom-
panying the chattel, and that they, in fact, are not purchasing the item.
IV. WHY ALLOW PRIVATE LEGISLATION?
There may be a good argument that parties can contract around some
of these rules in some circumstances. But federal intellectual property law
is a comprehensive regulatory scheme that can and does place limits on
such contracts. Of course, this does not mean that there is no role for con-
tracts in the intellectual property realm. Licensing remains critical to the
efficient use of intellectual property.'67
What role should private legislation play in the transfer of chattels that
benefit from intellectual property? Some argue that private legislation has
165 Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified,
sub nom. Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
166 Softman, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Dak Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d 1091,
1091 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Wise, 550 F.2d at 1190.
167 Lemley, supra note 37, at 1291.
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no role and that all private legislation affecting the rights of those who pos-
sess chattels that embody intellectual property should be unenforceable.
68
Others argue for a national body of regulation governing private legislation
as it applies to licenses. This approach has been attempted twice (UCC Ar-
ticle 2B and UCITA) without success. A third and more workable solution
would be for courts to enforce contracts based on their primary purpose.
Licenses have a place in the commercialization of intellectual property and
chattels that benefit from intellectual property. If the primary purpose of the
license is not to extend the intellectual property owner's rights beyond
those granted in public legislation, but rather to serve a more traditional
right under private contract law, then the license should be enforced. One
purpose of contracts is to encourage parties to share information, and the
benefits to society of this sharing outweigh the rights removed from indi-
viduals by these contracts, in some scenarios. Private legislation is needed
to balance public legislation, particularly in industries that are not ade-
quately covered by existing statutes.
Parties may enter into licenses because they are mutually beneficial.
Where the terms are bargained for, not unexpected, and augment but do not
circumvent public legislation, they should be enforced. Contracts promote
efficiency and the public good by allowing parties to make promises that
have legal effect and therefore provide stability and continuity. As de-
scribed above, many licenses help parties avoid the accountability forced
on them by public legislation. However, many licenses are entered into
because public legislation does not adequately protect intellectual property
owners' rights. The latter licenses ought to be enforced, while the former
need to be closely scrutinized.
An emerging area of licenses being used to augment the rights of the
intellectual property owner is in the world of art. An artist has a certain
view of her art and a strong proprietary interest in what happens to it. In
some instances, an artist's view of what changes her work may differ from
the court's view. For instance, in the 1990s, the artist Annie Lee sold note-
cards and lithographs of her copyrighted work.'69 One consumer of these
168 In 1997, Representative Rick Boucher introduced the Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act,
proposing that such private legislation be unenforceable:
Section 301(a) of title 17, United States Code, is amended by inserting the following at the
end thereof:
When a work is distributed to the public subject to non-negotiable license terms, such terms
shall not be enforceable under the common law or statutes of any state to the extent that they:
(1) limit the reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance, or display, by means of
transmission or otherwise, of material that is uncopyrightable under section 102(b) or other-
wise; or
(2) abrogate or restrict the limitations on exclusive rights specified in sections 107 through
114 and sections 117 and 118 of this title.
H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. (1997).
169 Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
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products, A.R.T. Company, mounted the artist's works on tiles, laminated
the tiles, and then sold them to consumers to hang in their houses, even in
their bathrooms. 7' Lee sued, contending that the tiles were derivative
works,' 7' and that only she, as the owner of the artworks' copyright, had the
right to create (or to authorize) derivative works.' The court did not dis-
agree with Lee, but instead found that the tiles were insufficiently transfor-
mative to qualify as a derivative work.' The tiles changed the expression
of the original protected idea, but not to such an extent as to qualify as a
derivative work.'74 Lee's sale of her artwork exhausted her rights in it, al-
lowing A.R.T. Company to use it however they saw fit, as long as that use
was not so transformative as to qualify as a derivative work.' To maintain
the expression of her copyrighted ideas in a way consistent with her vision,
then, Lee would have to license, and not sell, the expressions of her ideas.
In situations such as this, the artist's rights are better protected under pri-
vate legislation than through the rights granted to a purchaser through pub-
lic legislation, and as a result contract terms specifying what rights transfer
with artwork is becoming common.'76 One well-known art lawyer, Joshua
Kaufman, explained this trend:
As an artist or a publisher, let us assume you want to prevent third parties from creating un-
authorized derivative works from your artworks. True, there are a number of cases which
provide that unlicensed canvas transfers--making tiles, cutouts, mini-prints, etc. of original
works--infringe on the rights of the copyright holders. However, there isn't a large body of
170 id.
171 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1999) ("A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture ver-
sion, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elabora-
tions, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative
work"').
172 Id. § 106(2).
173 Lee, 125 F.3d at 582.
174 Id. The Lee decision created a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit. See Munoz v. Albuquerque
A.R.T. Co., 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994); Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d
1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
175 Lee, 125 F.3d at 581 (citations omitted) ("Now one might suppose that this is an open and shut
case under the doctrine of first sale, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). A.R.T. bought the work legiti-
mately, mounted it on a tile, and resold what it had purchased. Because the artist could capture the value
of her art's contribution to the finished product as part of the price for the original transaction, the eco-
nomic rationale for protecting an adaptation as "derivative" is absent. An alteration that includes (or
consumes) a complete copy of the original lacks economic significance. One work changes hands mul-
tiple times, exactly what § 109(a) permits, so it may lack legal significance too.").
176 For instance, the iTunes license specifically states that the licensee "agree[s] not to modify,
rent, lease, loan, sell, distribute, or create derivative works based on the Service, in any manner." iTunes
Terms of Service, supra note 16.
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law in the area .... By licensing, instead of selling your art, you will not be at the mercy of
a judge who does not understand copyright law or the art business. Instead, when you license
art, you set the terms and conditions that define the license, and you establish terms that will
specifically prohibit the use of your artwork in any way except as you intend. A print is to be
a print only; it is not to be made into a canvas transfer. A calendar, book or catalog are to be
used as calendars, books or catalogs, not packaged as some cheap and offensive product. A
license can prohibit the person who acquires the physical work from creating canvas trans-
fers, decoupages, tiles, mini-prints and the like. Since you never give up ownership, you re-
tain the right to control all of its uses.
17 7
Field-of-use restrictions that limit the use of an item to only one field
or medium (e.g., notecards must remain notecards) are commonly found
(and enforced) in licenses of goods that benefit from patent law.' Such
terms allow patented technology to be used for a particular purpose.
179
Field-of-use terms could allow the copyright owner to restrict the ways in
which licensed products could be used and thereby provide protection in
the artist's vision of the expression of her protected ideas. Using private
legislation to protect interests not adequately covered by public legislation
should be allowed. It augments, and does not circumvent, public legisla-
tion.
But a justification for a license is not enough; all licenses must be ex-
amined carefully because one legitimate purpose behind a license does not
mean that the license's primary purpose is legitimate. A license clause that
prevents redistribution may be included to augment protection of the in-
formation contained in the licensed work, or it may be included to augment
profitability of the licensed work.8 0 A licensor may argue that the terms of
the license ensure quality control over the licensed chattel, when, in fact,
use of the chattel under normal conditions would not result in its deteriora-
177 Joshua Kaufman, Stop selling art: license it: take a hint from the software industry and license,
instead of sell, your art, ART BUS. NEWS, Mar. 2003, available at http://www.findarticles.comlp/articles
/mi_mOHMU/is_3_30/al_98695113.
178 Exploring the ramifications of expanding field-of-use restrictions to copyright law is a topic for
another article. The Supreme Court approved of the enforceability of non-price restrictions in licenses in
Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
179 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellec-
tual Property, 5 (1995), available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf ("Field-of-
use, territorial, and other limitations on intellectual property licenses may serve procompetitive ends by
allowing the licensor to exploit its property as efficiently and effectively as possible. These various
forms of exclusivity can be used to give a licensee an incentive to invest in the commercialization and
distribution of products embodying the licensed intellectual property and to develop additional applica-
tions for the licensed property. The restrictions may do so, for example, by protecting the licensee
against free-riding on the licensee's investments by other licensees or by the licensor. They may also
increase the licensor's incentive to license, for example, by protecting the licensor from competition in
the licensor's own technology in a market niche that it prefers to keep to itself. These benefits of licens-
ing restrictions apply to patent, copyright, and trade secret licenses, and to know-how agreements.").
180 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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tion. '5 A license clause may delineate the parties' agreement, or it may
restrict the publicly-legislated rights of the party to whom the chattel was
transferred.
In order to maintain a balance between the rights of intellectual prop-
erty owners and the rights of users, some private legislation is necessary.
Concerns arise, however, when such legislation is used to augment owners'
rights while eroding users' rights. Intellectual property owners are setting
the norms for licenses of products that benefit from intellectual property,
and the costs to the potential users have not been fully considered in this
realm.
CONCLUSION
[Tihe movement at the state level toward resolving questions as to the enforceability of non-
negotiated contracts coupled with legally-protected technological measures that give right
holders the technological capability of imposing contractual provisions unilaterally, in-
creases the possibility that right holders, rather than Congress, will determine the landscape
of consumer privileges in the future.
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When should the private right to enter into a contract be limited in
scope by the public interest in promotion of intellectual property? A bal-
ance must be struck between allowing intellectual property owners to aug-
ment their rights for the purpose of circumventing public legislation and
allowing them the freedom to protect their interests through the use of pri-
vate legislation. 83 When such protection serves a legitimate purpose not
181 One reason Monsanto contends that its license should be enforceable is that it enables Mon-
santo to exercise quality control over the seed covered by its technology. Even the courts doubted this
logic:
As Monsanto's expert testified, "[t]he loss of quality control may result in reduced yields,
improper seed segregation and lower quality crops, causing a reduction in the value of Mon-
santo's brand" to purchasing farmers. We are skeptical of the magnitude of harm to Mon-
santo's ROUNDUP READY® brand that would flow from violations of the licensing agree-
ment. Damage to a brand occurs when a consumer, here the farmer, receives a substandard
product believing that the product is genuine. The farmer who saves and replants seeds, how-
ever, is well aware that he is not using the seeds in accordance with the terms required by
Monsanto, and he is able to attribute any alleged reduction in quality of the second- or third-
generation seeds to his own decision to replant rather than to Monsanto's initial product.
Without denying that some minimal harm to the ROUNDUP READY® brand may result
from a decision to save and replant seed, we do not believe that this harm [is significant].
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
182 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS OFFICE PURSUANT TO §
104 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT xxxi (2001), available at http://www.copyright.gov/
reports/studies/dmca/sec- 104-report-vol- 1 .pdf.
183 One classic limit on the breadth of the freedom to contract has come from antitrust law. A
contract is not enforceable if it unduly restrains trade. There is another article yet to be written which
will address more fully the extent to which a license can limit the use of the product before the terms
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contrary to public legislation, then private legislation of intellectual prop-
erty rights should be enforced. Much of the support behind the intellectual
property system rests on the idea that it protects the public's interest. But
the system as it exists today regulates the sale of intellectual property and
not the licensing of it. Without thoughtful extension of the principles of
intellectual property into the domain of licenses, the balance between the
rights of the intellectual property owner and the public interest in intellec-
tual property shifts away from the public interest.
By licensing chattels rather than selling them, intellectual property
owners can circumvent public legislation and expand the protection of in-
tellectual property far beyond the scope envisioned by federal and state
governments. The balance between the rights of intellectual property own-
ers and the rights of intellectual property users is tipping in favor of the
owners, as those drafting the private legislation are setting the new norms
for protection of intellectual property. Beyond the narrow issues currently
considered in license enforcement cases, this broader trend deserves the
public's attention.
become an unreasonable restraint on trade. If the licensor can provide a legitimate purpose or justifica-
tion for the terms of the license, then the license is likely to be enforceable. Terms have been found
reasonable that provide for a limited-use license because the quality of the product will otherwise de-
generate (an argument that has been made for art and genetically modified seed). Unreasonable terms
may be those that eliminate the purpose of buying the chattel in the first place or require the purchase of
another product.
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